agents, in conjunction with members of the MFJP, searched both residences and seized certain documents relating to Verdugo-Urquidez's involvement in narcotics trafficking and the assassination of Camarena Salazar. 16 In particular, the search of the Mexicali residence uncovered a tally sheet, which the government believed reflected quantities of marijuana smuggled into the United States by Verdugo-Urquidez. 17 The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress evidence seized during the searches, concluding that the fourth amendment applied to the searches and that the DEA agents had failed to justify searching Verdugo-Urquidez's premises without a warrant. 1 8 The District Court found that Verdugo-Urquidez, a registered alien, was among "the people" protected by the fourth amendment. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision. 20 In support of its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on two Supreme Court decisions: Reid v. Covert 2 ' and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza. 22 Reid concerned the right of American citizens to be protected by the fifth and sixth amendments when tried by United States military authorities overseas. The Court held that citizens abroad are entitled to the protections of the fifth and sixth amendments. 23 Lopez-Mendoza concerned the rights of aliens illegally within the United States to be protected by the fifth and sixth amendments. In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court went beyond Reid and held that illegal aliens were also entitled to these constitutional rights. 24 Based on these two decisions, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it would be odd to acknowledge Verdugo-Urquidez's entitlement to fifth and sixth amendment protections, but deny him the protections afforded by the fourth amendment.
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 26 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting that the fourth amendment functions differently from the fifth amendment. 2 7 The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment 28 is a fundamental right of criminal defendants; its violation may occur only at trial.29 By contrast, a violation of the fourth amendment is "fully accomplished" at the time of an unreasonable government intrusion. 3 0 Thus, if there was a constitutional violation in this case, it occurred solely in Mexico; as such, it was not a domestic matter. The Chief Justice also examined the fourth amendment phrase "the people." 32 Unlike the fifth and sixth amendments which apply to all criminal defendants regardless of citizenship, the fourth amendment has been interpreted to apply only to "the people." The majority interpreted "the people" as a term of art referring to "a class of persons who are part of a national community or have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be 26 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy.
27 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060. 28 The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States proclaims that,
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject to the same offence be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. CONsT 31 Id. The majority stated that the locus of the search is of constitutional importance. The Court apparently believes that government actions that violate the language of the fourth amendment in foreign jurisdictions cannot be recognized as constitutional violations in U.S. courts. Thus, the fact that the violation of the language of the fourth amendment occurred in Mexico means that a victim of United States government action abroad cannot be restored. However, this is based on the incorrect notion that the Constitution only controls within the borders of the United States. Recall, for example, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The point lost on the majority is that the fourth amendment restricts United States officials wherever a search takes place. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra Section IV.
32 See supra note 2.
[Vol. 81 considered part of that community." 3 3 Those who have not established a sufficient connection to this country are not one of "the people," and thus are not entitled to fourth amendment protections. The majority claimed that the legislative history of the fourth amendment also suggests that the purpose of the amendment was to restrict only those searches and seizures conducted by agents of the United States within the borders of the United States. 4 It was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States territory. There is likewise no indication that the fourth amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory. The Court also distinguished its holding in Lopez-Mendoza, where a majority of justices assumed, but did not decide, that the fourth amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United States. According to the Court, the decision in Lopez-Mendoza "did not encompass whether the protections of the fourth amendment extend (1950) 46 Id. The Court omitted the fact that Verdugo is a registered United States alien and was lawfully within the United States at the time of the search, albeit against his will. None of these cases requires that an alien's presence be voluntary. Therefore, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, these cases should indeed apply. Id. at 1070 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 47 Id. at 1064. The Court distinguished Lopez-Mendoza by claiming that it relied on the assumption that the fourth amendment applies to illegal aliens within this country. However, this is an inaccurate characterization of the Court's holding. In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court impliedly recognized that illegal aliens within the United States have fourth amendment rights. Therefore, Verdugo-Urquidez, as an alien legally within this country, was entitled to protection under the fourth amendment. Moreover, in Lopez-Mendoza, even the Solicitor General of the United States conceded that illegal aliens have fourth amendment rights. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 39-40.
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to illegal aliens in this country." 48 In fact, even if such aliens were entitled to fourth amendment protections, they were distinguishable from Verdugo-Urquidez because they were in this country voluntarily; Verdugo-Urquidez had no voluntary connection with this country. Thus, there was no link which might place him among "the people" of the United States for purposes of the fourth amendment.
9
Finally, the majority turned to the possible negative consequences of accepting Verdugo-Urquidez's arguments. 50 In Verdugo-Urquidez's claims, the Court saw "significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its boundaries." 5 1 The Court feared that the rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad, but also to other foreign policy operations which might result in searches or seizures. 52 The Court, in particular, feared that the Court of Appeals' decision would tread on the authority of the political branches and the abilities of the armed forces. 53 "If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation." 54 Because Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico, with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and because the place searched was located in Mexico, the Court concluded that the fourth amendment could not be applied. 5 
B. CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Kennedy concurred with the opinion of the Court. 5 6 Justice Kennedy, however, rejected the notion that the reference in the fourth amendment to "the people" was intended to restrict its protections. 57 Rather, the crucial consideration in Justice Kennedy's analysis of cases involving the extraterritorial application of the Constitution, was whether the person claiming its protection is a citizen or an alien. 58 According to Justice Kennedy, a fine distinction should be observed when noting whether the person claiming the protection of the Constitution is a citizen or an alien, as "the Constitution does not create, nor do general principles of law create, any juridical relation between our country and some undefined, limitless class of noncitizens who are beyond our territory." 5 9
In light of this distinction, Justice Kennedy suggested that the question addressed by the Court should be refocused. One alternative focus is "what constitutional standards apply when the Government acts, in reference to an alien, within its sphere of foreign operations?" 60 Constitutional protections must be interpreted "in light of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad. ' 61 Thus, "there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place." 6 2
In conclusion, Justice Kennedy noted that "the conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 63 Justice Brennan, joined by justice Marshall, authored a dissenting opinion. In his powerful dissent, Justice Brennan recognized that the nature of the Court's holding was such that "although foreign nationals must abide by our laws even when in their own countries, our Government need not abide by the Fourth Amendment when it investigates them for violations of our laws." '69 Quoting the plurality opinion in Reid, Justice Brennan noted that "the United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. ' 70 Furthermore, as Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, "the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic." 7 1 Thus, in the opinion of Justice Brennan, the majority created an antilogy: "the Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce our criminal suming authority, whether a United States Magistrate would issue the warrant in accordance with the demands of the United States Constitution and our conceptions of privacy and reasonableness. While the warrant requirement might be disposed of by Justice Kennedy's conception, it does not discard the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
66 Id (Stevens, J., concurring). 67 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 68 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). However, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the Warrant Clause exists so that a magistrate can make a determination of the reasonableness of the proposed search. It is not necessary for the constitutional purposes discussed here that the magistrate be empowered to grant the particular warrant. Id. at 1076-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 70 Id. at 1069 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)). This is one of the strongest expressions of the "organic perspective" by the Court, and stands in stark contrast to the Court's holding in Verdugo-Urquidez. See supra note 33 (discussing elements of the organic perspective).
71 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1069 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this authority, the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them. This cannot be. At the very least, the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correlative of the Government's power to enforce the criminal law." '72 Justice Brennan criticized the nebulous borders of the majority's definition of "the people. ' 73 Justice Brennan pointed out that:
the Court admits that 'the people' extends beyond the precise borders of the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its 'sufficient connection' test unclear. At one point the majority hints that aliens are protected by the fourth amendment only when they come within the United States and develop 'substantial connections' with our country. At other junctures, the Court suggests that an alien's presence in the United States must be voluntary and that the alien must have 'accepted some societal obligations.' 74 None of the cases cited by the majority 75 required an alien's presence to be "voluntary" before the alien could claim the benefits of the Constitution. In establishing its "sufficient connection" test, Brennan explained that the majority ignored the most obvious connection between Verdugo-Urquidez and the This should have entitled him to all the protections of the Constitution. Justice Brennan also explored the notion of mutuality, which he felt the majority had disregarded. 78 He made a simple point of fairness:
If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and 80 Allowing the government to act with disregard for the law can only breed contempt for the law, inviting anarchy and destroying the values of law and order. 8 1 "By placing respondent among those governed by federal criminal laws and investigating him for violations of those laws, the Government has made him a part of our community for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." 8 2
Adding fuel to the fairness argument, Justice Brennan noted that while "the majority suggests a restrictive interpretation of those with 'sufficient connection' to this country to be considered among 'the people,' the term 'the people' is better understood as a rhetorical counterpoint to 'the government,' such that rights that were reserved to 'the people' were to protect all those subject to 'the government.' "s83 This was the mindset of the Framers, who designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit the government from infringing on pre-existing rights and liberties. Eisentrager as having 'rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.' ",85 These.were not the grounds for the decision in Eisentrager. Rather, as this Court wrote in Eisentrager, "disabilities this country lays upon the alien who becomes also an enemy are imposed temporarily as an incident of war and not as an incident of alienage." '8 6 Thus, the Eisentrager Court "rejected the German nationals' efforts to obtain writs of habeas corpus not because they were foreign nationals, but because they were enemy soldiers. '87 Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted that the Insular Cases also do not stand for the propositions that the majority suggested. "The Insular Cases all concerned whether accused persons enjoyed the protections of certain rights in criminal prosecutions brought by territorial authorities in territorial courts." 8 9 The Insular Cases were limited to their own particular facts long ago by the Court's holding in Reid v. Covert, where the Court proclaimed that "it is our judgment that neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion." 90 Finally, Justice Brennan examined the reasons for enforcing the Warrant Clause where a warrant would be of no legal effect. 9 ' The Warrant Clause would serve the same primary functions abroad as it does domestically, and I see no reason to distinguish between foreign and domestic searches .... A warrant defines the scope of a search and limits the discretion of the inspecting officers .... These purposes would be served no less in the foreign than in the domestic context. 92 That an American warrant would be of no legal force within Mexico is of no consequence to the interpretation of the fourth amendment, since "as a matter of United States constitutional law, a warrant serves the same primary function overseas as it does domestically: it assures that a neutral magistrate has authorized the search and limited its scope." '93 This is no less important abroad than within our country's borders. 94 Justice Blackmun also authored a dissent in this case. 95 While stipulating that the relationship between agents of the government and foreign nationals is fundamentally different than that between United States officials and individuals residing in this country, 96 Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan that "when a foreign national is held accountable for purported violations of United States criminal laws, he has effectively been treated as one of 'the governed' and therefore is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections." '97 In this scheme, it is the enforcement of domestic criminal law that implicates the fourth amendment and not the government's exercise of power beyond our shores. 98 Because an American magistrate is powerless to authorize foreign searches, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Warrant Clause was inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen's residence abroad. 9 9 However, Justice Blackmun would have remanded the case for a determination as to whether the search violated the reasonableness re-quirement of the fourth amendment. 100 
IV. ANALYSIS
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court wrongly decided that the protections of the fourth amendment do not apply to the search and seizure of property located in a foreign country and owned by a nonresident alien legally present in the United States. In its decision, the majority misconstrued both the history and the purpose of the fourth amendment, as well as its own prior decisions, and blatantly disregarded fundamental notions of fairness.
A. HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND THE TEXT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court relied on the text of the fourth amendment, historical evidence, and cases refusing to apply certain constitutional provisions beyond the borders of the United States. As Justice Brennan pointed out, however, "none of these . . . justifies the majority's cramped interpretation of the fourth amendment's applicability."' 1 0 1 , The principles forwarded by the majority are unsupported by the text and historical purpose of the fourth amendment. The amendment was drafted "primarily to restrict the government's ability to obtain evidence from a criminal defendant for use in his prosecution." 1 0 2
The purpose of the fourth amendment also supports its application, at a minimum, to all people whom the United States has subjected to criminal prosecution ...
. As early as 1886, [in Boyd v. United States 103]
the Court explained the intimate connection between the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and a fair criminal trial.' 04 That the search here was conducted abroad is irrelevant for purposes of constitutional interpretation. "The critical factor is not the locus of the search, but the fact that United States officials conducted it for the express purpose of obtaining evidence to use in Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's prosecution here."' 0 5 "Similarly, in applying the exclusionary rule, the Court has stated that 'the need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strong-100 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 101 Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 102 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 5.
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
104 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 13. 105 Id. at 5. In 1886, the Court declared that the fourth and fifth amendments "apply to all invasions. on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life . . . any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime." Id. at 13 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) .
est where the government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search.' " 106 The text of the fourth amendment demonstrates that it is of no consequence that the search of the residences of a registered alien lawfully within the United States took place outside the boundaries of the United States. The plurality in Reid expressly repudiated such a "territoriality" notion, 1 0 7 and "since Reid, no court has suggested that any constitutional provision is inapplicable because the challenged conduct occurred in a foreign country."' 0 8 Furthermore, no territorial limitations can be found in the language of the fourth amendment. In fact, the Court has held that the fourth amendment refers to and protects "people" rather than "areas." 1 0 9 By contrast, other Constitutional provisions specifically limit their geographical protections. 1 1 0 For example, Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution requires that all duties, imposts and excises "be uniform throughout the United States."' 1 1 The Constitution also grants Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas." 112 Not only is the fourth amendment without geographical limitations, it also lacks the emphasis on citizenship that the majority wishes to give it. The majority's emphasis on the fourth amendment phrase "the people" is equally misplaced, improperly relying on the framers efforts to avoid a literal redundancy. As Justice Brennan noted, "the majority's suggestion that the drafters could have used 'person' ignores the fact that the fourth amendment then would have begun quite awkwardly: 'the right of persons to be secure in their persons.' " 113 The framers simply avoided an awkward rhetor-106 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 14 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974)).
107 "The approach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad has long since been directly repudiated by numerous cases." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 56 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The notion that the Constitution is inoperative outside the United States "has long since evaporated. Governmental action abroad is performed under both the authority and the restrictions of the Constitution." Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring). The plurality's approach was adopted three years later in Kinsella v. United States ev rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960). 108 
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[Vol. 81 ical redundancy in their use of the phrase "the people." 114 The term is thus "better understood as a rhetorical counterpoint to 'the government,' such that rights that were reserved to 'the people' were to protect all those subject to 'the government.' "115
In concentrating on the phrase "the people," the majority implicitly gave credence to the "social compact" perspective of constitutional interpretation, which "envisages the Constitution as a social compact that binds by mutual obligations both the government and 'We the People' of the United States."' 1 16 This perspective is inapposite with a long history of constitutional interpretation. Citizenship itself cannot serve as the touchstone for the applicability of constitutional rights, because the Supreme Court has long recognized that aliens within the United States, even illegally, enjoy a broad panoply of such rights.' 1 7 "This panoply includes the fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures."
118
Only once has the Court applied the social compact doctrine, in Dred Scott v. Sanford. 1 19 The Court should be careful not to repeat this ignominious bit of history. Therefore, "the people" must be synonymous to "the governed."' 120 Verdugo-Urquidez became one of the governed when the United States first investigated and then arrested him for violation of its laws. These two events created the "substantial connection"
114 ACLU Brief, supra note 48, at 12 n.4. 115 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 116 Note, Extraterritorial Applicability, supra note 33, at 1674. See also supra note 33 (discussing social compact theory).
117 Note, ExtraterritoyialApplicability, supra note 33, at 1675-76. Indeed, most legal classifications based on alienage are subject to the most severe form ofjudicial review, the "strict scrutiny" test. 393 (1856) . 120 This position is consistent with .the "organic perspective" discussed supra note 33.
for which the majority searched in vain. The majority simply ignored the most obvious connection between Verdugo-Urquidez and the United States: he was investigated and arrested by officials of this country and may be subject to lengthy incarceration in an American prison. Consequently, as Justice Brennan properly pointed out, the "substantial connection" is ironically supplied not by Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the government.
12 1
Invocation of the exclusionary rule presupposes that an alien is in United States custody and is being prosecuted in a United States courtroom for a violation of United States law. As the 'government seeks to exploit the fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the alien in the United States,' it strengthens the nexus created at the time of the search.
122
It should be noted here that the "substantial connection" test appears nowhere in the history of the fourth amendment, and there is nothing else to suggest that the framers thought it should be a factor. Indeed, it comes perilously close to the "social compact" perspective that the Court has long since rejected. Thus, the Court erred in two respects: first, in applying a "substantial connection" test which is not within the realm of the fourth amendment; and second, in holding that Verdugo-Urquidez failed to meet the test. The majority also erred in its construction of the Court's prior decisions. Had the Court properly construed its own holdings, it could not have reached the result that the majority reached here. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the majority misconstrued and mischaracterized the cases it chiefly relied upon. Neither Eisentrager nor the Insular Cases stands for the propositions that the majority suggests. Indeed, the Insular Cases did not even concern constitutional rights vis-a-vis United States agents, but vis-a-vis the local territorial authorities. 29 developed a better approach to the issues presented by this case. In Toscanino, the Second Circuit applied fourth amendment protections to foreign wiretapping in the context of a federal criminal prosecution of a foreign national. The Second Circuit concluded that "it is beyond dispute that an alien may invoke the fourth amendment's protection against an unreasonable search and seizure conducted in the United States."' 8 0 The Second Circuit next made dear that there is no sound basis on which to support a different rule "with respect to aliens who are the victims of unconstitutional action abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit the fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the alien in the United States."' 3 ' This notion is buttressed by the holding of the Supreme Court in Balzac, in which the Court declared that, "the Constitution of the United States is in force... whenever and wherever the sovereign power of that government is exerted," 2 and is recognized by the "organic" or "natural rights" perspective.
precedents. 3 5
The Court's holding in Balzac is more consistent with constitutional principles than the holding in the present case. Aliens in this country have been consistently protected by those provisions of the Constitution not expressly limited to American citizens.' 3 6 Conversely, the Constitution expressly limits the actions of United States officials abroad. "In applying the Constitution abroad... it is always a United States citizen-a government official-who is being controlled by the Constitution."' 1 3 7
B. MUTUALITY
In its decision, the Court creates an impermissible paradox: while foreign nationals must abide by our laws, even when in their own countries, our government need not abide by our laws-in particular the fourth amendment-when conducting investigations of these same foreign nationals. As Justice Brennan pointed out, such a decision ignores all notions of mutuality and simple fairness. "If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them."' 3 8
This fundamental principle has been recognized since the time of the framers and is essential to the fundamental fairness that underlies the Bill of Rights. 1 39 James Madison, speaking on the rights of aliens under the Constitution, noted that "it will not be disputed that, as [ The Court may well be caught up in the "war on drugs." This country certainly is caught up in the "war" attempting to eradicate one of our country's gravest social ills. Verdugo-Urquidez has been convicted in a separate proceeding for his involvement in the highly publicized torture and murder of American Drug Enforcement Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar.' 4 4 Since the murder, the Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Administration has been "relentless in its efforts to track down and bring to justice everyone involved in his death."' 45 Indeed, the Justice Department's efforts are widely rumored to include kidnapping and the use of bounty hunters. 14 6 Among the more peaceful measures taken to track down the killers was Operation Intercept, in which the United States searched every car coming out of Mexico for clues to the murder.' 47 The Court may have felt moved to punish all those responsible for a grizzly and public assassination. Several other aliens, including the a brother-in-law of a former Mexican president, have been convicted in United States courts for events connected with the 141 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071 (BrennanJ., dissenting). This, of course, also relates to the historical purpose of the fourth amendment, discussed throughout this section.
142 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
143 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoted in Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. The death of DEA agent Enrique Camarena Salazar sparked a great deal of fury and received much attention both in the press and in policy-making circles. 145 L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at B6, col. 1.
murder. 1 48 The murder was committed following days of torture at the hands of foreign drug smugglers, and included injections to keep Camarena Salazar's heart from failing during the brutal interrogation.
14 9
While the briefs obliquely refer to the death of a DEA agent, the Court referred sharply to a "kidnapping and torture-murder." 15 0 It is at least curious that the Court should stress facts that would otherwise seem less than intimately connected to the constitutional issue at hand.' 5 '
V.
CONCLUSION
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the United States Supreme Court improperly ruled that the fourth amendment does not protect individuals against the search and seizure of property that is both owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. The Court reached this decision even though the material seized was specifically intended for use at trial against the alien within the United States.
In its holding, the Court diverged from precedent establishing the broad rights of aliens under the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. The Verdugo-Urquidez majority reduced the investigation of the rights of aliens to a substantial connection test that can be found nowhere in the Constitution. In doing so, the Court implicitly adopted notions of territoriality and social compact long since rejected, and ignored its prior holdings recognizing the natural rights of aliens. Furthermore, the Court cast a blind eye to fairness and the philosophy of mutuality implicit in the Bill of Rights in general and the fourth amendment in particular.
Allowing nonresident aliens the protection of the fourth amendment when their homes abroad are violated by United States agents fulfills the purpose of the fourth amendment. That purpose is to limit the government of the United States from improperly abridging the rights of any person. Its protections do not run to citizens alone. Ruling in Verdugo-Urquidez's favor would have lim-ited the government's behavior only when it acts without regard to constitutional restraints and would not have unnecessarily impinged on the powers of the political branches. Instead, the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the fourth amendment rights of nonresident aliens damages the purpose of the Bill of Rights and lays waste to considerations of mutuality and fairness.
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